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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2011, China announced plans to build a “city-sized cloud
computing and office complex that will include a mega data center,”
signaling a rapid growth in information technology (IT) spending.1
Meanwhile, Facebook is building a 300,000-square-foot “server farm” in
northern Sweden to store the personal data of its European users.2 In late
2011, U.S.-based company Amazon.com announced the release of its Kindle
Fire tablet, a device that not only backs up all of the user’s information in the
cloud, but also uses the cloud to log all of that user’s activity.3
As the world becomes increasingly digitalized, concerns arise about the
security and privacy of personal and commercial information. This
information is being steadily moved to “the cloud,” an Internet-based service
that “provide[s] consumers with vast amounts of cheap, redundant storage
and allow[s] them to instantly access their data from a web-connected
computer anywhere in the world.”4 However, this convenience comes with
risks such as exposure to hackers and privacy invasion.
This Note will argue that the government regulations currently in place in
the U.S., European Union (EU), and China are inadequate to protect the
privacy of cloud consumers. The Note begins by defining cloud computing
and its ramifications on the privacy of its users. It will then set out laws that
govern cloud computing in the U.S., EU, and China, and demonstrate how
they are outdated and insufficient to protect cloud users. Finally, this Note
will recommend that countries adopt a uniform, updated definition of cloud
computing while continuing to develop privacy policy according to their own
national and regional interests.

1
Patrick Thibodeau, China Building a City for Cloud Computing, COMPUTERWORLD.COM
(Feb. 7, 2011, 5:59 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9208398/China_building_
a_city_for_cloud_computing.
2
Rob Waugh, That’s Really Cool: Facebook Puts Your Photos into the Deep Freeze as It
Unveils Massive New Five Acre Data Center Near Arctic Circle, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 28, 2011,
9:48 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2054168/Facebook-unveils-massivedata-center-Lulea-Sweden.html#ixzz1dYknZf9L.
3
David Behrens, Tech Talk: New Kindle under a cloud, YORKSHIRE POST (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/lifestyle/indoors/gadgets-and-tech/tech_talk_new_kindle_und
er_a_cloud_1_3896956.
4
Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back
Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360–61 (2010).
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II. CLOUD COMPUTING
A. Defining Cloud Computing
The cloud computing model is perceived to be “the future of
computing.”5 However, a debate exists over the formal definition of “cloud
computing.”6 The National Institute of Standards & Technology describes
cloud computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction.”7 Generally speaking, cloud computing is the
idea that software and data can be accessed as a service on the Internet rather
than stored locally on one’s own computer.8 Cloud computing pledges to
overcome problems presented by the “dispersed computing” structure, the
traditional model of computing in which each user stores and accesses his
personal information on one computer.9 Electronic mail was the first to
transition,10 closely followed by companies like Google, Amazon, and
eBay.11 The global cloud computing industry is still developing, with a
majority of technology experts predicting that by 2020 “most people will
access software applications online and share and access information through
the use of remote server networks.”12
B. Benefits of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing offers five major benefits to both commercial and
individual consumers: reduced cost, increased storage, alleviated the
depended on information technology (IT) personnel, augmented reliability,

5

Id. at 364.
William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing and
Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010).
7
PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF
CLOUD COMPUTING, SPEC. PUBL’N 800-145, at 2 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/public
cations/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
8
Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, and Privacy?, 9 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29 (2010).
9
William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the
Store Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 (2010).
10
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 363.
11
Denny, supra note 6, at 237.
12
Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW INTERNET (June 11,
2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1623/future-cloud-computing-technology-experts.
6
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and expanded accessibility.13 First, most cloud services are “either free or
significantly cheaper than more traditional desktop offerings.”14 Second,
cloud computing has eliminated user concerns about a computer’s storage
capacity, memory, and updates since applications run directly from the
cloud.15 Thus, hard disk space that would have been taken up by traditional
software is available for other uses.16 Third, business users benefit because
IT personnel no longer need to be concerned with keeping software up to
date.17 Fourth, cloud-based services regularly back up files stored on
multiple servers so that users never have to worry about losing their data in
the event of a hardware failure.18 Fifth, cloud-based systems allow users to
access their information from anywhere in the world where there is an
Internet connection.19
C. Privacy Issues in the Cloud
Although cloud computing offers many advantages to business and
consumer users, significant risks come with the massive amounts of sensitive
data handled by cloud providers.20 One such risk is vulnerability to
computer hackers as user data is often transmitted via unencrypted network
connections, making the access to obtain users’ private information easy for
hackers.21 Although encryption protecting against hackers is used in some
cases of lower-priority cloud services such as email, it only applies during
the initial login phase and not during subsequent data transfers.22 For
example, the risk of data breach is increased when users are connected to
unsecured public wireless networks, such as those at coffee shops.23 In
addition, because a cloud provider might store the data of multiple users on
the same physical equipment, cloud users face the risk of isolation failure,
13
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 365; see also Six Benefits of Cloud Computing, SYS-CON
MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://web2.sys-con.com/node/640237 (listing six ways in
which the public sector and government IT organizations could benefit from cloud
computing).
14
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 366.
15
Lanois, supra note 8, at 29–30.
16
Id.
17
Six Benefits of Cloud Computing, supra note 13.
18
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 366.
19
Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 617, 622 (2011).
20
Denny, supra note 6, at 238.
21
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 372.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 373.
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i.e., an attack on one person may lead to a “guest-hopping” attack as a result
of the inadvertent or intentional commingling of data.24
A factor that exacerbates this issue is the changing societal attitude
toward online privacy.25 Younger users “have much less concern about
online privacy than older generations,” and “are more likely to embrace the
Internet’s interconnectedness and convenience by participating in social
networking, sharing digital content, and using cloud services.”26 To them,
“values such as cost, convenience, efficiency, and networking” outweigh
privacy concerns.27
Cloud users also face possible exposure from cloud providers.28
Institutions such as banks and online merchants are legally liable for online
fraud, so they have an incentive to encrypt customers’ data as it is
transmitted over the Internet.29 Cloud providers, however, have no such
liability concerns even though an email account may have information that is
just as sensitive as the information in a bank account.30 One way cloud
providers could be forced to standardize encryption is through market
pressure. However, due to “widespread (yet understandable) ignorance” of
most users31 and the current societal attitudes,32 “[t]here simply isn’t
sufficient market demand for these providers to allocate the considerable
financial and engineering resources required to [provide] encryption by
default for all of their products.”33
Since data is stored on servers worldwide, cloud-based services also bring
into play the question of jurisdiction.34 The existing legal structure intended
to protect data that flows around the globe is insufficient to protect end
users.35 Data privacy laws are not globally uniform, and, as such, “data that
might be secure in one country may not be in another.”36 The determination
24
Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off My Cloud: Defining and Protecting the Metes and
Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 283, 296–97 (2010).
25
Robison, supra note 9, at 1237.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 378.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 379.
31
Id. at 380.
32
Robison, supra note 9, at 1237.
33
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 380.
34
Lanois, supra note 8, at 44; see also Kevin J. O’Brien, Cloud Computing Hits Snag in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at B4 (noting that India and Malaysia are “growing hubs
for cloud computing data centers”).
35
O’Brien, supra note 34.
36
David Binning, Top five cloud computing security issues, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr.
24, 2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/01/12/235782/Top-five-
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of whose law applies to information stored in the cloud may depend on
factors such as “the type of user, the location of the user’s computer, the
location of the cloud provider’s server(s), or some combination of these
variables.”37 Due to these variables, a user’s privacy may “vary significantly
with the terms of service and privacy established by the cloud provider,”
leading to the abuse and exploitation of that user’s information.38
Another threat to consumer privacy stems from the “ease with which the
government can force an application provider to insert a backdoor or flaw in
its own products.”39 For example, China, notorious for its rigid censorship of
the Internet,40 recently demonstrated the extent to which the government
could regulate Internet activities. Skype is a “voice-over-IP software
program that lets users make free peer-to-peer phone calls and conduct
instant messaging over the Internet.”41 In China, Skype operates through
TOM-Skype, a joint venture with Tom Group, and it dominates the Chinese
market.42 The year after TOM-Skype was released, the company admitted
that the software contained “a filtering mechanism that prevents users from
sending text messages that include banned phrases such as ‘Falungong’ and
‘Dalai Lama.’ ”43 Skype executives then confirmed that they had simply
been complying with local Chinese law, and that other cloud providers such
as Microsoft and Yahoo had all done the same.44 Although government
intrusion was a risk before the era of cloud computing, “it has been made
more effective, and more difficult to discover through the shift to clouddelivered software.”45

cloud-computing-security-issues.htm#4.
37
Barry Reingold et al., Cloud Computing: Whose Law Governs the Cloud? (Part III),
CYBERSPACE LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 1, 1.
38
Lanois, supra note 8, at 44.
39
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 423.
40
See China Tightens Internet Controls, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010, 12:32 PM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8530378.stm (noting that China practices “extensive censorship” of the
“world’s biggest online population).
41
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 407–08.
42
Sui-Lee Wee & Chris Buckley, Skype’s Partner Says It Is Legal in China, REUTERS (Jan.
4, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/04/us-china-skype-idUSTRE703
1DR20110104.
43
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 408.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 423–24.
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III. DATA PRIVACY LAWS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, AND CHINA
A. European Union
In approaching the privacy issues surrounding cloud computing, the EU
has focused on privacy as a fundamental right46 in developing “minimum
standards for the E.U. member states’ . . . data privacy legislation.”47 The
1995 European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (EU Directive)48
“standardized the requirements for the protection of personal information
across all the countries within the EU.”49 Specifically, the EU Directive:
1.

2.

3.

limits organizations’ right to collect personal
information, including restricting the amount of
information to be gathered and limiting such
collection to a specific permitted purpose;
requires certain organizations to obtain the consent of
the data subject prior to using the personal data or
disclosing such data to a third party; and
regulates transborder flows of personal data,
effectively prohibiting organizations from exporting
personal data to countries without adequate privacy
laws (which includes the United States).50

The EU Directive was superseded in 2002 by the Directive on Privacy
As
and Electronic Communications (2002 ePrivacy Directive).51
continuation of earlier privacy legislation policy efforts, the 2002 ePrivacy
Directive sets forth two main obligations: first, providers of electronic
communications services “must take appropriate technical and
organi[z]ational measures to safeguard security of its services,”52 and,
second, EU member states are required to maintain confidentiality of

46

Lanois, supra note 8, at 37.
Vadim Schick, Data Privacy Concerns for U.S. Healthcare Enterprises’ Overseas
Ventures, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 173, 180 (2011).
48
Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
49
Lanois, supra note 8, at 37.
50
Schick, supra note 47, at 180.
51
Council Directive 2002/58, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002
O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC).
52
Id. art. 4(1).
47
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personal information.53 More importantly, member states must restrict
“listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of
communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users”54
unless the user is “provided with clear and comprehensive information.”55
Although the update of the EU Directive was a step forward in privacy
legislation, it did not provide guidance about “how and when the opportunity
to refuse the storage of, or access to the information, needs to be given,
leaving each EU Member State . . . free to provide its own interpretation on
these issues.”56
In 2009, the 2002 ePrivacy Directive was amended to increase individual
privacy protections.57 One major change in the 2009 ePrivacy Directive is
the amendment of Article 5(3), which now provides:
Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or
the gaining of access to information already stored, in the
terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on
condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or
her consent, having been provided with clear and
comprehensive information . . . about the purposes of the
processing.58
Experts are split regarding the actual application of this change and how it
relates to the rest of the Directive. One view is that Article 5(3), requiring
the user’s consent, conflicts with the Preamble of the Directive, which refers
to both the “right to refuse” and “consent.”59 The Preamble states that users
“engaging in any activity which could result in such storage or gaining of
access” must have a “right to refuse” the obligation to provide information
after being presented with “clear and comprehensive information” regarding
Another term requires “the user’s consent to
such information.60
processing.”61 A right to refuse can be viewed as an “opt-out,” in which “an
activity occurs unless the user stops the processing and indicates his
opposition.”62 In contrast, consent is an “opt-in,” which “implies that no
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. art. 5(1).
Id.
Id. art. 5(3).
Lanois, supra note 8, at 16.
Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11–36 (EC).
Id. art. 2(5).
Id. art. (66).
Id.
Id.
Francoise Gilbert, 2002 EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (As
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activity can occur unless the user has done some act that expresses his
consent.”63 The varying interpretations of the terms in the amended Article
5(3) and Preamble “may result in significant discrepancies in the laws of the
different Member States, the opposite effect . . . of a directive.”64 Another
view concerning the inclusion of both of these terms is that the EU meant to
“emphasize that the user must be presented with a clear choice and must be
able to give ‘any freely given specific and informed indication of his
wishes.’ ”65 Given the EU’s historical emphasis on personal privacy, the EU
most likely fashioned the Directive in order to protect individuals through
both opt-in and opt-out measures.
Although experts disagree about the conflicting terminologies, they
mutually agree that the 2009 ePrivacy Directive does not answer the question
of how the user’s consent will be obtained.66 The 2009 ePrivacy Directive
states that “the user’s consent to processing may be expressed using the
appropriate settings of a browser or other application.”67 A user would
express consent through the settings on his browser so that it reflects his
individual privacy preferences.68 However, less sophisticated users are less
likely to be aware of their ability to change the default settings chosen by the
manufacturer of the Internet browser,69 which is usually set to a low level of
privacy protection.70 This assertion is supported by the Data Protection
Working Party (Working Party), an independent advisory body on data
protection and privacy created by Article 29 of the EU Directive.71 The
Working Party issued an opinion stating that “[i]t is a fallacy to deem that on
a general basis data subject inaction . . . provides a clear and unambiguous
indication of his/her wishes.”72 The question of browser setting choices thus
Amended by Directive 2009/136/EC), in ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND DATA
SECURITY LAW 49, 62 (2010).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 63.
65
Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting Council Directive 95/46, supra note 48, art. 2).
66
See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 62, at 62–63 (arguing that the user’s expression of consent
through an Internet browser causes confusion).
67
2009 O.J. (L 337) 20 at (66).
68
See Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (“[W]hen the user has set his or her browser settings to
reject cookies, then such a privacy setting would be sufficient to indicate his or her refusal to
allow the content provider to store information or gain access to information stored on the
computer.”).
69
See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 62–63 (noting that less sophisticated Internet users choose
the setting determined by the manufacturer of the product).
70
See Lanois, supra note 8, at 20 (stating that three major Internet browsers have default
settings allowing the free flow of cookies, technology used to track users as they browse the
Internet).
71
Council Directive 95/46, art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
72
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioral
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brings up the question of consent or, more specifically, the extent to which
users can consent when they are not aware of what they are consenting to.73
Despite these updates, however, EU legislation remains obsolete.74 In
2010, the European Commission (EC) had experts draft a report on the future
of cloud computing in the European Union.75 The report noted that the
current legislation is vague and not inclusive of developments in cloud
computing technology.76 The findings of the report reflect the legal
recommendations made by the European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA) in their 2009 report, which included a detailed risk
assessment of cloud security.77 The ENISA Report called for clarification of
certain terms as well as the re-examination of concepts such as “transferring
data” in light of new technological developments since the 2009 ePrivacy
Directive was drafted.78
The USA Patriot Act of 200179 (Patriot Act) presents further barriers to
widespread European acceptance of the cloud.80 The Patriot Act “expands
law enforcement’s surveillance and investigative powers and grants the U.S.
government the right to demand data on the grounds of homeland security.”81
As a result of the broad right of surveillance granted in the Patriot Act,
European customers fear that the U.S. government could gain access to
sensitive information in the course of an investigation.82 In addition, the EU
Advertising, WP 171, at 14 (June 22, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/p
rivacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf.
73
Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (“[C]an informed consent be validly implied if the user has
not changed the browser’s default settings that are set to allow all cookies?”).
74
See id. at 31 (contending “there is still some uncertainty regarding the extent of the rules
within a cloud computing environment” within the European Union).
75
See Lutz Schubert, The Future of Cloud Computing: Opportunities for European Cloud
Computing Beyond 2010, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ic
t/ssai/docs/cloud-report-final.pdf.
76
See id. at 46 (“[T]here are plenty unsolved legalistic issues yet to be addressed, in
particular related to the location of data and / or code.”).
77
Daniele Catteddu & Giles Hogben, Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks, and
Recommendations for Internet Security, EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY
AGENCY [hereinafter ENISA Report], available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliv
erables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment.
78
Id. at 84–85 (calling for clarification of terms such as “Joint Controller,” research about
the effect of data transfers to countries that do not meet the security threshold set by the EU
Directive, etc.).
79
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
80
See Denny, supra note 6, at 239 (noting that European companies are hesitant to have their
data stored on computers in the U.S. government would be able to easily access that data).
81
Lanois, supra note 8, at 24.
82
Id.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:15 AM

2013]

A CLOUDY FORECAST

491

Directive puts “stringent standards on the collection of electronic data by the
government and by any other entity.”83 The EU Directive allows information
to be transferred outside of the EU only if the receiving country ensures an
“adequate” level of protection—the United States is not deemed to be one of
these countries.84
In order to promote European development of cloud-based services, the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission developed the
International Safe Harbor Certification program,85 which provides a
framework of data protection principles.86 The goal of the Safe Harbor
framework is to “permit the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S.
while assuring an ‘adequate’ privacy protection overseas.”87 The safe harbor
framework allows U.S. organizations to “self-certify” that their standards
comply with the EU Directive’s standard of an “adequate level of
protection”88 and also adhere to the Safe Harbor principles: notice, choice,
onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement.89 Despite
these measures, however, international companies are still hesitant to enter
the EU cloud computing market.90
B. United States
In contrast to the overarching regulations of the EU, privacy legislation
development in the U.S. “has been very fragmented and sector-specific.”91
In addition, many impediments hinder the judicial and legislative
development of privacy protections in the context of cloud computing.

83

Denny, supra note 6, at 239.
Lanois, supra note 8, at 27.
85
U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor Framework, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp
(last updated Mar. 31, 2011).
86
David Satola & Henry L. Judy, Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing
International Cooperation and Collaboration in Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks:
Reflections on the Proceedings of the Workshop on Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010
United Nations Internet Governance Forum, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1745, 1765 (2011).
87
Lanois, supra note 8, at 29.
88
Id.
89
Shick, supra note 47, at 185.
90
See O’Brien, supra note 34 (noting that it is costly and time-consuming to prepare EUmandated service agreements between data processors and cloud computing providers located
in countries that have not been approved by the EU to provide cloud computing services).
91
Symposium, It’s All About Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Obligations in Global
Privacy and E-Transactions Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2007).
84
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1. The Judicial Perspective
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that this right “shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”92
The Fourth Amendment is therefore designed to protect against the search of
private documents such as a person’s diary, personal letters, and other
property.93 The emergence of cloud computing has led to questions about
the extent of Fourth Amendment protections regarding individual privacy in
the framework of new technologies.94
Cloud service users often depend on cloud providers to provide sufficient
security for their information.95 However, courts have held that the Fourth
Amendment doctrine precludes an expectation of privacy when information
is provided to a third party.96 The reason for this conclusion is the thirdparty doctrine, the idea that people have no expectation of privacy in the
information communicated with a third party.97 The third-party doctrine was
applied in Wilson v. Moreau, in which the court held that a public library
employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because “[t]he
library was an open and public work environment, the computers were
available for public use, the stored documents were accessible to other
computer users, and whatever e-mails that were stored in the system had
been disseminated or received over the shared network.”98 This case and
others applying the Fourth Amendment suggest “that courts are unlikely to
enhance privacy protections for cloud computing users.”99 The lack of
Fourth Amendment protections in this context may result in “online service
providers [being] compelled to reveal their customers’ private documents
with a mere subpoena.”100 Thus, although the third party doctrine is not the
main reason for the lack of privacy online, its application by the courts “is

92

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 390.
94
Kattan, supra note 19, at 623.
95
See Soghoian, supra note 4, at 375 (noting the extent of data, such as bank account
information, that is stored on web-based services).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose . . . .”).
97
Id. at 442.
98
Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 104 (D.R.I. 2006).
99
Robison, supra note 9, at 1232.
100
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 391.
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certainly the current tool of choice for the government’s evisceration of the
Fourth Amendment . . . .”101
2.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored
Communication Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted by
Congress in 1986.102 The ECPA was designed to increase privacy protection
in the face of developing technologies by requiring law enforcement to
adhere to a higher standard when attempting to access electronic data.103
Among other provisions, the ECPA prohibits, with some exceptions,
attempted or actual interceptions and disclosures of “any wire, oral, or
electronic communication.”104 However, the ambiguous definition of
“intercept” depends on an archaic interpretation of “communication.”105
Intercept is defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device.”106 This definition should apply to data stored
in the cloud, but “courts have struggled to clarify” the meaning of
communication.107 For instance, in United States v. Ropp, the court
dismissed charges against an employer who attempted to eavesdrop on the
computer activities of one of his employees using KeyKatcher, a program
that records the electronic signals generated by depressing keys on a
keyboard.108 The court based its decision on the fact that this interception
did not fall under the ECPA’s definition of “electronic communication”
because it was stored on local computer hardware, the computer’s Central
Processing Unit, and was never transmitted through a network.109 This
ruling was based on the traditional model of computing in which users must
actively connect to the Internet, and are only connected for short periods of
time.110 However, in the world of cloud computing, where internet users are
always connected, this interpretation of “electronic communication” is no

101

Id.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006)).
103
Martin, supra note 24, at 305.
104
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
105
Martin, supra note 24, at 305.
106
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
107
Martin, supra note 24, at 305.
108
United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
109
Id. at 837–38.
110
Martin, supra note 24, at 306.
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longer valid.111 The problem of interpretation here may also cause confusion
when applying other parts of the ECPA.
The Stored Communication Act (SCA) was enacted by Congress as part
of the ECPA to protect information kept in electronic storage.112 Congress
sought to regulate two primary uses of computer networks: (1) electronic
communication service (ECS), which is defined as “any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications,”113 and (2) remote computing services (RCS), which are
“intended to provide outsourced computer processing and data storage.”114
A remote computing service is defined as “the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system.”115
The SCA offers different protections depending on the characterization of
the service (ECS or RCS).116 Data stored with an RCS “receives fewer
privacy protections than communications held by an ECS.”117 Most cloud
computing services can fall within the definition of either category, which
could potentially lead to confusion in applying the SCA.118 For messages
stored in an ECS for 180 days or less, the SCA requires that law enforcement
obtain a search warrant.119 If the message has been stored for 180 days, law
enforcement can gain access using the lower RCS threshold.120 However,
when it comes to nongovernmental entities users may have less privacy
control over their personal identifying information such as name, physical
and e-mail addresses, and IP address.121 A service provider “may divulge a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such
service to any person other than a governmental entity.”122 The government
can also compel service providers to disclose personal information through
an administrative subpoena.123

111
See id. (noting that broadband Internet connections in today’s society “are always on,
always connected”).
112
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006).
113
Id. § 2510(15).
114
Robison, supra note 9, at 1205.
115
18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
116
Kattan, supra note 19, at 631.
117
Robison, supra note 9, at 1208.
118
Martin, supra note 24, at 307.
119
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
120
Id. § 2703(b).
121
Robison, supra note 9, at 1208.
122
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2006).
123
Id. § 2703(c)(2).
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Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. is one example of the difficulty
courts face in determining whether a service is an ECS or RCS.124 In Quon,
the Ninth Circuit held that a text-messaging service was an ECS despite the
fact that the service provider had archived the messages and offered remote
messaging services.125 When determining that the service was an ECS, the
court relied on the legislative history of the SCA.126 Unfortunately, this
legislative history dated back to 1986, and the law was formed based on the
definitions of technology at that time.127 The court’s approach thus relies on
definitions based on obsolete technology in an environment where these
distinctions no longer matter.128
These issues with interpretation of the SCA demonstrate that it “fails to
provide a clear framework for understanding whether a user has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his communications stored in the cloud.”129
Therefore, although the ECPA does provide certain privacy protections
against law enforcement,130 it has not caught up to the advancements
introduced by cloud computing.131
3. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
In 1986, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in
order to address computer hacking,132 but it has been broadened to include
both civil and private rights of action for breaches of the Act.133 The CFAA
prohibits

124

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 902.
126
Id. at 901.
127
Id.
128
Martin, supra note 24, at 307.
129
Kattan, supra note 19, at 645.
130
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006) (prohibiting law enforcement from the use of illegally
intercepted wire or oral communication); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (requiring that law
enforcement follow a detailed process to obtain authorization to intercept communication).
131
Kattan, supra note 19, at 648 (“In 1986, when ECPA was passed, the Internet consisted
of a few thousand computers . . . . There were no web pages, because the web had not been
invented. Google would not be founded for another decade. Twitter would not be founded for
another two decades.” (quoting ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Edward W. Felten, Professor of
Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University))).
132
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
133
Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two
Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 429 (2009).
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the unauthorized access and disclosure of data that
“could be used to the injury of the United States,”
the unauthorized acquisition of data from financial
institutions, U.S. agencies, or a private computer
used in interstate commerce,
unauthorized access to a U.S. department or
agency computer,
unauthorized access to a protected computer with
knowledge and the intent to defraud and obtain
something of value
the intentional damage of a protected computer, or
an intentional transmission of a program that
causes damage to a protected computer
the intentional trafficking of passwords of
protected computers with an intent to defraud, or
the threat to damage a protected compute with the
intent to extort something of value.134

Although the CFAA “seems to create a powerful deterrent to most
computer crime,” it lacks the force to be an effective deterrent to
cybercrime.135 For instance, felony penalties are only triggered when the
damage exceeds $5,000 within a one-year period.136 However, actual
damage is often “difficult to ascertain or quantify,” and programs that are
installed on one date may not cause harm until much later.137 Thus, it would
seem that the CFAA is yet another privacy law that needs to be updated to
conform to the current cloud computing framework.
C. China
Like the United States, China has passed some sector-specific laws,138 but
cloud computing has not been directly addressed by Chinese law.139
However, there are some sector-specific laws that could still apply to the
134

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006).
Martin, supra note 24, at 308.
136
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006).
137
Martin, supra note 24, at 308.
138
Donald C. Dowling, International Data Protection and Privacy Law, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE (Aug. 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/367982f8-6dc9-478e-ab
2f-5fdf2d96f84a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/30c48c85-a6c4-4c37-84bd-6a4851f87a
77/article_IntlDataProtectionandPrivacyLaw_v5.pdf.
139
Sarah Xuan, Legal Issues Associated with Cloud Computing in China, HG.ORG (Nov. 23,
2010), http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=20501.
135

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:15 AM

2013]

A CLOUDY FORECAST

497

cloud computing structure.140 First, Article 12 of the Ministry of Information
Industry’s Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services
Provisions states “[e]lectronic messaging service providers shall maintain the
confidentiality of the personal information concerning the online subscribers
and may not disclose the same to third parties without the subscribers’
consent . . . .”141 Second, Article 7 of the Computer Information Network
and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations states “[t]he
freedom and privacy of network users is protected by law,” adding “[n]o unit
or individual may, in violation of these regulations, use the Internet to violate
the freedom and privacy of network users.”142 This regulation could be
applied to cloud computing to protect against Internet hackers and viruses.
Another provision that could protect against hackers is Article 18 of the
Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of
International Networking of Computer Information in the People’s Republic
of China, which states:
Internet users are forbidden from entering certain computer
systems without permission and illegally changing [third party]
information; distributing malicious information, giving out
information in other people’s names and violating others’
privacy through networks; developing and spreading computer
viruses[,] and engaging in other activities in violation of
legitimate rights and interests of networks and individuals.143
Another potentially applicable regulation is the Interim Administrative
Measures on Internet-based Transactions of Goods and Related Services
(Interim Measures), which focuses on business-to-consumer (B2C),
business-to-business (B2B) and consumer-to-consumer (C2C) activities.144
140

Id.
Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services Provisions (promulgated by the
Ministry of Industry and Info. Tech., effective Oct. 8, 2000), http://www.chinesewalker.cn/20
09/08/15/ministry-of-information-industry-administration-of-internet-electronic-messaging-se
rvices-provisions/.
142
Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management
Regulations (promulgated by the Ministry of Pub. Sec., effective Dec. 30, 1997), http://www.
lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/information-technology/computer-infor
mation-network-and-internet-security-protection-and-management-regulations-1997.html.
143
Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of International
Networking of Computer Information in the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Information Computerization Leaders Group of the State Council, effective Feb. 13, 1998),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6562.
144
Interim Measures for the Trading of Commodities and Services through the Internet
(promulgated by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, May 31, 2010,
141
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Although the Interim Measures are aimed at regulating e-commerce sites
such as Taobao.com(C2C) and alibaba.com(B2B),145 its existence may
indicate a trend toward regulation and increased consumer advocacy in
China. Thus, Chinese consumers may have their privacy protected against
private corporations, but enjoy no such protection against the Chinese
government.
In the absence of clear legal guidelines specifically addressing cloud
computing, the context in which the Internet and consumer privacy has
developed should be analyzed. In 2009, the International Data Corporation
(IDC) estimated that only four percent of Chinese businesses were using
cloud-based services.146 This is, in part, because China’s large state-owned
businesses want to maintain control of IT assets, and are, therefore,
suspicious of third-party services, such as cloud computing.147 However,
although its usage of web-based technology “lags badly,” the fact that China
has the world’s largest population of Internet users,148 and increasing Internet
sophistication may play a factor in the development of cloud computing in
China’s business sector.
Despite most Internet users’ suspicion of the cloud, cloud computing
development “benefits from a favo[ ]rable policy environment in China.”149
China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has
focused on cloud computing as a “key project” in China’s technological
development.150 In 2010, the MIIT chose Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Hangzhou, and Wuxi to lead the way in cloud computing and development,
and up to two trillion yuan in government funds are being devoted to
telecommunications infrastructure investment.151 China’s city governments
effective July 1, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/interim-measures-for-supervisi
on-and-management-of-internet-information-service-market-ito-trans-2.pdf.
145
Steven Chow, First Ecommerce Regulation Introduced in China, CHINA ONLINE
MARKETING (June 1, 2010), http://www.china-online-marketing.com/news/laws-regulations/fi
rst-ecommerce-regulation-introduced-in-china/.
146
Wayne Arnold, Regulations and Security Concerns Hinder Asia’s Move to Cloud
Computing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at B8.
147
Id.
148
Christina Larson, The Man Behind Cloud Valley, TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://
www.technologyreview.com/business/38726/?p1=BI.
149
Andrew McGinty, The Hazy Cloud – Legal Challenges for Delivering Cloud Computing
in China, HOGAN LOVELLS, http://ehoganlovells.com/rv/ff0001f56ad18fc97abed201ea4aaf4ec
ab5ac52/p=6 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
150
Gov’t Investment in Cloud Computing Essential, Says Microsoft, XINHUA (June 18,
2010), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-06/18/content_22810819.htm; see also Tony
Zhu, China’s Cloud Computing Market Could Reach RMB 1 tln by 2013, BUS. CHINA (Apr.
12, 2011), http://en.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-4-12/4OMjMyXzIwOTg4OA.html (stating that
the MIIT has earmarked 5 Chinese cities to pilot cloud computing development).
151
Henry Acland, China Focus: The Virtualization of a Nation, Cloud Computing in China
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also have announced plans for significant investment in cloud computing
development.152 In addition, the Chinese government, recognizing that cloud
computing, as a developing industry, is lacking in regulation, has also
pledged to develop more cloud regulations in the future.153
The Chinese government’s eager endorsement of cloud computing may
cause conflict with its privacy policy, which is widely recognized as the
world’s strictest in regards to internet freedom.154 Although China’s
Constitution provides for freedom of speech,155 China has zealously
practiced internet censorship in the name of national security.156 In fact,
China has enacted certain laws that permit the Chinese government to attain
this private information in the name of state security.157 These laws prohibit
information that endangers state security, deteriorates to the state’s honor,
causes ethnic oppression, disseminates rumors that disrupt social stability,
spreads pornography, undermines state religious policy, or “preaches the
teachings of evil cults.”158 The terms of these regulations are “needlessly
vague,” which results in over-censoring since users lack adequate guidelines
as to what is or is not appropriate.159 While Chinese regulations signal a
trend toward consumer protection against corporations, no protection is
offered against government intrusion. This discrepancy could hinder the
development of cloud computing in China, especially as its increasingly
Internet-savvy population moves its data to the cloud.
Takes Hold, XINHUA (June 29, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/
29/c_13956822.htm.
152
Shervin Bakhtiari, Cloud Computing in China – The Greatest Hurdle?, BUS. CLOUD
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.businesscloudnews.com/platform-as-a-service/604-can-clo
ud-computing-prosper-in-china.html.
153
MIIT: To develop planning standards of cloud computing, C114 (July 21, 2011, 2:10
PM), http://www.cn-c114.net/575/a630404.html.
154
See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Says Web Control Follows the West’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2006, at A6 (“China operates a vast and technologically sophisticated firewall to
protect the ruling Communist Party against what it views as Web-based threats to its
authority.”).
155
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 4, 1982, art. 35 (China).
156
See Jessica E. Bauml, It’s a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges
Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 707–08 (2011) (arguing that
although China “contends that censorship is necessary to promote the nation’s stability and
maintain security by avoiding political upheaval,” its “censorship laws are on the extreme end
of the spectrum”).
157
State Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated Order No. 68 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, effective Feb. 22, 1993), http://www.china.org.
cn/english/government/207480.htm.
158
Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (promulgated by Decree No. 292
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, effective Sept. 25, 2000), http://www.
chiaculture.org/library/2008-02/06/content_23369.htm.
159
Bauml, supra note 156, at 705.
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IV. CORPORATE COMPLICITY
Cloud users may also be subject to government intrusion via the cloud
providers who protect their private data. For instance, China’s censorship
laws impose obligations on foreign internet content providers, such as Yahoo
and Microsoft.160 In 2006, the Chinese government succeeded in forcing
Microsoft to shut down the blog of an outspoken government critic, Zhao
Jing.161 In 2005, Chinese journalist Shi Tao was sentenced to ten years in
prison for sending “state secrets” to foreign websites through his Yahoo
account.162 The arrest was made possible by Yahoo’s offices, which handed
over the information that was ultimately used to identify the account
holder.163 Due to the Chinese government’s strict censorship policy, cloud
computing corporations operating in China may have to compromise their
customers’ privacy in order to satisfy the government’s demands.
Cloud computing consumers in the U.S. and the EU may also be affected
by such government-mandated corporate intrusion, though it may not be as
overt as the cases in China. Although American companies profess a
devotion to their customers’ privacy to the press,164 critics argue that the only
privacy interest actually being protected is the companies’ “own collection
and commercial use of customer data and the extent to which they share it
with other companies.”165 Customers are therefore not protected from
intrusion by the government,166 and “firms are now regularly compelled to
modify their products in order to facilitate the government’s interest in
surveillance and search.”167 For example, a U.S. statute requires that both
ECS and RCS providers must notify authorities upon learning of the
presence of child pornography on their servers.168 Cloud providers are
therefore obligated to “review content that has been flagged by their users or

160

Id.
The Long March to Privacy, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.economist.com/no
de/5389362.
162
US Rebukes Yahoo over China Case, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2007, 7:11 PM), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7081458.stm.
163
The Long March to Privacy, supra note 161.
164
See Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 191–
92 (noting that companies such as Verizon, Google, and Microsoft are committed to
protecting their customers’ privacy).
165
Id. at 193.
166
See id. (“Few companies effectively protect their customers’ data from intrusive
government searches.”).
167
Soghoian, supra note 4, at 400.
168
18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2006).
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other third parties.”169 They are not, however, obligated to seek out such
materials, although several ISPs have chosen to do so.170 Critics argue that
this approach could lead to questionable information gathering because
“once a technical infrastructure has been designed and deployed, service
providers are not in a position to limit the extent to which they can be
compelled to use it.”171
Adopting a zero data retention policy is one way that cloud computing
providers could protect costumers’ privacy. When no information about the
customer is stored, no information is available to the government. Despite
the fact that the costs of keeping data are increasingly cheap, the costs
incurred by cloud providers through lawsuits and data breaches may provide
a financial incentive for corporations to delete data.172 Although some IPSs
in Sweden have enacted zero data retention policies in response to customer
demands, none of the major American ISPs or telecommunications carriers
have done so.173 As a result of the adoption of the zero data retention
policies in Sweden, the head of the Swedish Police’s National IT crime unit
noted that it has become “harder for the police to track down criminals
carrying out serious crimes.”174 This response could echo the American
government’s likely argument that if they were not able to force cloud
providers to reveal customers’ information, it would be much more difficult
to catch pedophiles and terrorists.
Cloud computing has made government intrusion cheaper and easier to
obtain than ever.175 A zero data retention policy may be available to
corporations, but they are unlikely to adopt that policy because of business
models such as Google’s, which “mines” the data of its users to provide
targeted advertisements and generate revenue for itself.176 Thus, what is
likely the most effective way to protect consumer privacy is through an
overarching legal structure such as that of the EU.

169

Soghoian, supra note 164, at 202.
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that
AOL developed a program to scan its customers’ email attachments of child pornography).
171
Soghoian, supra note 164, at 203.
172
Id. at 209.
173
Id. at 214.
174
Enigmax, Police Say Anti-Piracy Law Makes Catching Criminals Harder,
TORRENTFREAK (May 17, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/police-say-anti-piracy-law-makes-cat
ching-criminals-harder-100517/.
175
See Soghoian, supra note 4, at 398 (“A move to encrypted cloud-based services will
likely lead to a significant reduction in the ease with which law enforcement agents can obtain
the private files of suspects.”).
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Id. at 396.
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V. INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
A. Barriers to International Cooperation
Cultural standards may affect each region’s approach to privacy
legislation. For example, in the U.S., “Americans have been less likely than
Europeans to turn to the government to regulate private enterprise, instead
relying on the market or new technologies to address public concerns about
commercial activity.”177 In contrast, the EU’s policy of strict protection of
personal privacy is shaped by the brutal events of World War II.178 In China,
less concern about personal privacy may be a result of the collectivist
society,179 which calls for the sacrifice of personal privacy to benefit group
efforts.180 However, although privacy has not traditionally been valued in
China, the concept of privacy may be gaining currency as Western
technology and attitudes continue to infiltrate Chinese society.181 The
changing attitudes of the Chinese may be useful in drafting a cloud
computing privacy policy that could be applied globally.
The cultural discrepancies between these three diverse regions may be
offset by the integration of the U.S., EU, and Chinese economies, which is
reflected in areas such as “the number of corporate offices in each other’s
jurisdictions and the significant personal data flows between the two
Another important economic factor that may affect
economies.”182
international cooperation in the area of cloud computing privacy policy is the
“entangled and dependent” relationship between the U.S. and China.183

177

Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 461, 471 (2000).
178
See, e.g., Marsha C. Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods
the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 391, 441 (noting that EU
policy “is the culmination of over fifty years of Western European devotion to recognizing,
maintaining, restoring, and ensuring personal privacy” following the “barbarous acts” of
World War II); Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a
Self-Regulatory United States Amidst A Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data
Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 359 (“[A] European Union (EU) data-protection
regime vigorously defends the privacy of an individual’s personal information from both the
government and the private sector, largely as a result of the region’s grisly past.”).
179
Yang Wang et al., Who Is Concerned About What? A Study of American, Chinese and
Indian Users’ Privacy Concerns on Social Network Sites, in TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHY
COMPUTING 146, 152 (Jonathan McCune ed., 2011).
180
See David Brooks, Harmony and the Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A21.
181
The Long March to Privacy, supra note 161.
182
Satola & Judy, supra note 86, at 1768.
183
Bauml, supra note 156, at 716 (noting that “China holds about $800 billion of America’s
debt, while the United States is China’s most important market for its goods”).
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Although the relationship is complicated and strained,184 the
interconnectedness of these two countries’ economies may provide
incentives for both the U.S. and China to maintain a good relationship.
B. Proposals to Ensure Privacy in Cloud Computing
In order to address the issues of privacy in the cloud, several industry,
nonprofit, and government-sponsored groups have released proposals that
should be considered in drafting a policy about this topic.
One example of such a proposal is the Communication, subtitled “A
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”
(EU Communication), issued by the European Commission to the EU
Parliament and the Council in November 2010.185 The EU Communication
addresses the effects of cloud computing on privacy law, noting that changes
will have to be made to legislation based on the international nature of data
stored in the cloud.186 In addition, the EU Communication maintains the
privacy focus of previous legislation but emphasizes that changes such as
increased transparency to consumers need to be made in order to ensure
personal privacy.187
An alternative proposal is Microsoft’s Cloud Computing Advancement
Act, a legislative and industry initiative designed to “promote innovation,
protect consumers, and provide the [E]xecutive [B]ranch with the new tools
needed for a new technology era.”188 Noting that the ECPA was enacted
before the invention and utilization of current cloud technologies, the
proposal advocates for an update to the ECPA to fill in the legal gaps in the
current statute.189 The proposal also calls for bilateral and multi-lateral
discussions between countries, with Congress taking the lead in the U.S. in
helping “build consensus with other parliamentary holders.”190
184

Matt Spetalnick & Doug Palmer, Obama to China: Behave Like a “Grown Up,”
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2011, 9:23 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/
us-apec-idUSTRE7AB12920111114?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71.
185
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A comprehensive
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In terms of practical considerations, the first step for nations concerned
about the privacy implications of cloud computing is to agree on a uniform
definition of cloud computing. This definition should be updated with
regularity so that legislation can keep up with the rapid developments that
are to come as the cloud computing industry develops. Only with regular
assessments about the applicability of existing law can cloud users be
adequately protected.
Along with regular updates, international actors should emphasize
personal privacy as a focus of legislation regarding cloud computing. The
EU should build on its current policy of stringent privacy protection while
striving to update its obsolete legislation. The 2009 ePrivacy Directive
should be updated, taking into consideration the recommendations of
proposals, such as the EU Communication. New policy should also seek to
change the attitudes of European cloud users so that they feel more secure in
storing their information in the cloud.
In the U.S., Congress should eliminate the SCA’s ECS and RCS
categories and the distinction between how these two categories are treated
because they are outdated and confusing for courts to apply. Furthermore,
the ECPA should undergo a comprehensive overhaul that will result in a
final product that reflects developing technologies and the privacy
implications that go along with those developments. Punishments for
violations under the ECPA and the CFAA should, also, be reevaluated and
made more severe; the existing punishment structure has not proven to be a
clear deterrent against malicious online activity.
While arguing that China should adopt a privacy policy that promises
privacy from both the government and private corporations is easy, expecting
the Chinese government to loosen its censorship in the face of new
technologies is unrealistic. American privacy law has had over two hundred
years to develop, while China is still a maturing nation that has not had the
time to develop their privacy framework.191 Thus, the best step may be to
allow privacy protection in China to develop alongside cloud computing,
letting market forces govern how privacy legislation is shaped. By hesitating
to block Google completely following a showing of support by Chinese
citizens, the Chinese government has already shown that it is cognizant of
foreign cloud providers as well as the attitude of its citizens.192
Although government participation is important, cloud providers must
protect the rights of its customers against the government and against
themselves. To that end, cloud providers should adopt policies that limit the
191
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amount of data that they can retain. Although a zero retention policy is
likely unrealistic, a policy that strikes a balance between government
interests and personal privacy would prove beneficial to all parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
As more and more of our information is moved to the cloud, sources of
intrusion increase: hackers, corporate data mining, and government
surveillance. Information that was once only available on one computer is
now spread out on worldwide servers, bringing questions of jurisdiction and
data safety.
The legislative framework in the U.S., EU, and China are not equipped to
deal with the new technology presented by cloud computing. While
legislation in the U.S. and EU are obsolete in the context of privacy in
modern cloud computing, the Chinese government has no provisions for
privacy against online government intrusion. Corporations, also, play a role
in assisting governments in violating the privacy of its citizens.
In order to update cloud computing legislation with modern notions about
personal privacy, cooperation needs to happen at the international level.
Following international discussions on the definitions and implications of
cloud computing, national legislators should implement laws that update
modern Internet personal privacy, addressing issues such as increased
punishment for violations and outdated definitions.

